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It is traditional for equity analysts to criticise aca-
demics for living in ivory towers and having no
concept of the hard reality that financial markets
represent. However, I could not find very much to
disagree with in Doug Skinner’s paper. From an
analyst’s point of view, the question we really
want to ask is: how meaningful is book value? It is
easy to assert that book value has little meaning. If
you compare a company’s market capitalisation to
its book value, and they don’t match, that might
suggest that one or other figure is wrong. If you
think the price is broadly correct, then the book
value must be wrong; the accounts must be miss-
ing something.
If you are worried about book value being fairly
meaningless, then your return on any of those bal-
ance sheet numbers is also likely to be significant-
ly devalued. Should we do something to try to
improve our return-on-assets calculations?
Perhaps a better question to ask in the context of
what Doug has been saying is, ‘Is the current ac-
counting model broken?’ And, perhaps more im-
portantly, ‘Would fixing it make the capital
markets more efficient?’
Figure 1 summarises what analysts are striving
to do with financial information.
In the main, analysts concentrate on the profit
and loss account not the balance sheet. However
there are obviously some sectors where the bal-
ance sheet is much more important – real-estate,
banks and insurance analysts all spend a signifi-
cant amount of their time looking at the published
balance sheets for the companies they cover, but
they still look at the profit and loss (P&L) account
as well. However, outside those sectors analysts do
not start with the balance sheet. The balance sheet
is not the answer and, frankly, never will be. It is
all about income, as Sudipta’s paper alluded to. It
is about assessing the productivity of the business.
Current and proposed financial reporting rules
require companies to book P&L items that analysts
believe do not have direct economic significance
in relation to share prices. Given this presumption,
analysts will try to identify these items and ex-
clude them from their ‘adjusted earnings’ numbers
and companies respond to this by producing ‘pro-
forma earnings’ figures using similar adjustments.
Clearly, that gives us a problem because we
could have earnings before bad stuff, which a lot
of companies like to put out – Enron being the
classic example. At the other end of the spectrum
we could have a potential total comprehensive in-
come smorgasbord from which we can pick out the
nice bits using Extensible Business Reporting
Language (XBRL). We do not really want either of
those; we actually want something that is quite
hard to achieve but lies somewhere in the middle,
underlying operating earnings.
A good example that shows you how far re-
moved the focus of analysts is from the balance
sheet and what accounting standards are often
striving to do, is IFRS 3 and the US equivalent,
and the amortisation and impairment charges relat-
ing to acquisition intangibles and goodwill that 
result. Do those deductions actually have any 
economic significance? Does it actually have any 
impact?
IFRS 3 requires companies to work very hard to
identify acquisition intangibles and their useful
lives. They have to employ specialists, at signifi-
cant cost, and those specialists were not there a
few years ago. This is a whole new market that has
been created by accounting standard-setters, which
is good news if you are one of those specialists,
and good news if you are one of the auditors em-
ployed to check the methodology: they are not
going to shout ‘foul’. But, after all that hard work,
analysts basically ignore those numbers. People
find this very hard to believe but analysts and in-
vestors do not take account of the value of a cus-
tomer list, partly because they know the value is
very subjective and partly because it could disap-
pear tomorrow. Likewise they ignore the amortisa-
tion of such intangibles because it tends to double
count marketing costs that are already being ex-
pensed in the P&L.
I was very interested in Doug’s analogy about
credit analysts. Again, if you talk to credit analysts
they are even more hard-nosed about this than any-
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body else. ‘Can I take it from the managers and
flog it to somebody else? If I can, then it has value;
if I cannot, then I start to worry.’
Equity analysts are more interested in business
performance. We are not planning to take things
away from managers because we are investing in
them – so it is a slightly broader, more flexible ap-
proach. Fundamentally, analysts are ignoring
goodwill impairments and they are ignoring ac-
quired intangible amortisation. They are excluding
those figures when they are looking at analysis of
historic earnings and P&L data, and they are not
trying to forecast those going forward.
They will look at things like patents, R&D, etc.,
i.e. intangibles where there is a reasonably clear
intellectual legal framework, and a clearly defined
legal life, and where they can be transferred to
somebody else – licences and so on. Of course we
will look at those. But the more touchy-feely
things – can’t trust them!
Does that mean the accounting model is broken?
I think the better question, and this is an important
twist to that question, is: would the cost of capital
be lower if we did something about this perceived
problem?
I would agree entirely with what Doug has been
saying. Analysts do not want the balance sheet to
tell them the market cap, because it will be nine
months out of date. I can get Reuters or Bloomberg
or my market-maker down the road to give me an
estimate of market capitalisation now, not just then
but now, and he will trade on it. So I do not need
some sort of auditor/accounting standards process
to tell me what the company was worth nine
months ago; that is completely useless information
and tells me nothing about the future. I do not want
a balance sheet to give me a current value either at
a particular moment in time, or even if it could be
done on a real-time XBRL. ‘Let us look at the gen-
eral ledger; what is it worth now?’ I do not want
that. I trust the market to give me that information.
The market gets it wrong sometimes, but that is
okay.
Doug Skinner’s paper says that the case for re-
form is surprisingly weak and does not support
claims that large-scale reforms are necessary; and
in particular capital markets actually function
rather well in financing companies that are 
engaging in innovative, high-technology, knowl-
edge-based activities. We need to rely on private
incentives to encourage disclosure. That does not
mean that private incentives are working as well as
they should, and it certainly does not mean that all
the companies are squeaky clean and tell you
everything that they should, because clearly they
do not; so there are some inefficiencies there. But
I do not believe the solution would be to rearrange
the whole accounting framework and start trying
to bring more and more intangibles on to the bal-
ance sheet. In fact I am quite convinced that that is
not the solution that the market wants.
Another important point to mention is the fact
that the Corporate Reporting Users’ Forum, an in-
ternational group of sell and buy side analysts that
I am a member of, wrote recently to the IASB say-
ing: ‘We know you are thinking about looking at
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Figure 1
Background – analysts focus on the P&L, not the B/S
Earnings Underlying IFRS
before operating reported
bad stuff earnings earnings
IFRS is moving
towards total
comprehensive
income
(earnings after
everything)
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intangibles more. Well, don’t; just don’t do it.’ We
actually said: ‘We think it would be really positive
if you came out with a statement that said: “We
have thought about looking at it and we decided
not to; we decided to spend our limited resources
on something more productive.”’
And I think that is one of the key things. There are
lots of exciting debates we could have about intan-
gibles, and I am sure some of you can get research
budgets to do that for years and years and years –
and good on you! But frankly, that is not what real-
ly matters in terms of capital market efficiency.
There are some other situations that are much more
broken that are causing real mispricings.
Pensions would be one of my obvious examples,
because that is something I have spent the last 
18 months immersed in. You have only to look at
the fact that Boots could disclose a £20m surplus,
and then KKR could provide £1bn of funding
against the pension, to realise that there is a bit of
a difference – £20m surplus or £1bn funding.
There is something wrong there!
That is a much more fundamental issue, which
has nothing to do with intangibles.
I agree that we do not want to change things. I do
not think that intangible accounting is sufficiently
broken to warrant fixing.
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